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Just Compensation and Riparian Interests
In the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the Government is fre-
quently called upon to acquire riparian or littoral lands. Unless a mutually
satisfactory price is reached by negotiation, the question of "just compensation"
must be litigated in the courts.
While the value of land is a factual question, a substantial body of law
has grown up to assist the fact-finder. Just compensation is the market value':
"the price which might be obtained by negotiation and mutual agreement, after
ample time to find a purchaser, as between a vendor who is willing (but not
compelled) to sell, and a purchaser who desires to buy but is not compelled to
take the particular piece of property. '2  The value to be ascertained is, not the
gain to the Government, but the loss to the seller.3 The burden of establishing
this value is on the owner.' While evidence as to the values of separate*
elements of the property is admissible, as tending to show probable market
value,5 an appraisal arrived at by computing the sum of these values would be
held unrealistic and inadmissible.
Likewise excluded, as too speculative, are appraisals derived by the "balance
sheet" method-estimating the amount and market value (after processing) of
natural resources included in the property, and subtracting therefrom the
expected cost of processing and distribution.7 This type of appraisal cannot
properly exclude the effects of lack of competence of managerial personnel,
fluctuations in labor costs and market, etc. For example, the owner of an
abandoned iron mine was not permitted to prove, in eminent domain pro-
ceedings, that, by pulling the pillars remaining in the mine, it could realize a
profit of over $500,000.00.1 Expert testimony, it was said, cannot be based on
a series of conjectures.
The standard of compensation, therefore, remains the fair market value.
It is generally asserted that this value must be assigned with respect to the
"highest and best" use to which the property could be put.' But, when a
reasonable man would know that it was highly improbable that the property
could ever be used for the purpose claimed, this element would be excluded
from consideration. Thus, where an owner claimed increased compensation for
I Washington Water Power Co. v. U. S., 135 F. 2d 541 (9th Cir. 1943).2 Black, Law Dictionary.
a People v. Ocean Shore R. Co., 181 P. 2d 705 (Cal. 1947).
4U. S. ex rel T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266 (1943).5 U. S. v. 620 Acres of Land, 101 F. Supp. 686 (W. D. Ark. 1952).
6 U. S. v. 5 Acres, Suffolk Co., N. Y., 50 F. Supp. 569 (E. D. N. Y. 1943); U. S.
v. 13.40 Acres in Richmond, Cal., 56 F. Supp. 535 (N. D. Cal. 1944).
7 U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913); U. S. ex rel T. V. A. v.
Powelson, supra Note 4; U. S. v. 5 Acres, Suflolk Co., N. Y., supra.
" U. S. v. Certain Lands in Woodbury & Highlands, 51 F. Supp. 66 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).9 Iriarte v. U. S., 157 F. 2d 105 (1946), mod. 166 F. 2d 800 (1st Cir. 1948).
his land on the ground that it was suitable for use as a power site, evidence
of this claim was excluded, after the court found as a fact that the land could
not have been used for this purpose without flooding lands belonging to the
United States. The court said
Elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of
occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown
to be reasonably probable, should be excluded from consideration. 10
Unlike inland property, riparian land carries with it a variety of incidental
interests extending beyond its boundaries into the adjacent body of water. The
problem in eminent domain proceedings is to determine, in each case, what
these rights are, and which of them are "compensable," and therefore admissible
as evidence of value. Interests generally deemed compensable are the classic
"riparian rights" (enumerated infra, Page 37)11 and the title to the waterbed. 12
Not compensable are special statutory privileges accorded riparian owners, such
as the grant of the power of eminent domain to a water power company. As
brought out in U. S. ex rel T.V.A. v. Powelson,15 this is a mere revocable
privilege. As the state could not be required to make compensation for such
revocation, the United States should not be required to do so either. Compensa-
tion is required only for the taking of private property; and the delegated power
of eminent domain is not private property. In the Powelson case, the court
explained:
That which is not private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment likewise may be a thing of value which is destroyed or impaired by
the taking of lands by the United States. But . . . it need not be reflected
in the award due the landowner unless Congress so provides.
and again:
• . . not all losses suffered by the owner are compensable under the Fifth
Amendment . . . the sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not for
opportunities which the owner may lose.
For purposes of appraisal, the incidental interests attached to riparian
(or littoral) property are best classified according to the nature of the adjacent
water: (1) Open seas; (2) Navigable tidal rivers and harbors; (3) Navigable
non-tidal rivers; (4) Non-navigable rivers and streams; (5) Lakes. The follow-
ing is a brief summary of divergent views adopted by the courts of various
jurisdictions.
Open Seas
Although riparian rights were once thought to be limited to property
adjoining rivers and streams, this has been broadened, so that, today, the pro-
10 Washington Water Power Co., v. U. S., supra note 1.
"Hilt v. Weher, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N. W. 159 (1930); Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217
Minn. 536, 15 N. W. 2d 174 (1944).
12Hood v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 408, 165 So. 219 (1936).
I' Supra note 4.
prietors of land bounded by the ocean are held to have "littoral rights" sub-
stantially the same as the traditional "riparian rights."' 4
The ownership of the ocean bed, between the shore and the three-mile limit,
is a question that has greatly troubled courts both in England and America.
Although the Crown had, from time to time, made extravagant claims of
dominion over the seas,'6 the claim of the Prince of Wales, as littoral proprietor,
to vast coal workings under the English Channel was only quieted by a special
Act of Parliament; 16 and it was thereafter decided that the extension of the
Queen's realm to include the waters within the three-mile limit was for limited
purposes only.17
In our own country, after many dicta to the contrary, 8 it has been determined
that the United States possesses paramount rights in the marginal seas and the
underlying minerals, and that the States have no title or property interests therein.
The decisions, however, carefully avoid any assertion of full title in the federal
government; and there is a possibility that proposed legislation will throw this
question back to the states to decide. The reasoning by which the Supreme
Court arrived at this conclusion was that (1) dominion over the marginal seas
was necessary for the proper exercise of the federal functions in the spheres
of defense and diplomacy, and (2) since the original states had not, at the
beginning of the Republic, asserted any property in the tidelands, and since
the "three-mile belt" was a concept of international law developed thereafter as
an incident of national sovereignty, states admitted after the formation of the
republic must come in on an equal footing with the original states.'9
It is therefore apparent that littoral landowners possess no compensable
interests in the adjoining seas other than their classic "littoral rights."
Navigable Tidal Rivers and Harbors
At common law, only tidal waters were considered navigable. The beds
of such navigable rivers and harbors were the property of the Crown until
granted away2 0 As the public policy of England favors the vesting of all public
land in private ownership, most English waterbeds have been so granted over
the years. 21  In America, this property of the Crown became vested in the
14 56 Am. Jur., Waters § 282 (1947).
15 28 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 360; GoULD, WATERS, § 7.
16 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73.
17Regina v. Keyne, 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
Is Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 370 (1891); Illinois Central Railway Co. v. Illinois,
146 U. S. 387 (1892).
19 U. S. v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 804 (1947); U. S. v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707; 340
U. S. 900 (1950); U. S. v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699, 340 U. S. 899 (1950).
2O Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18; State ex rel Rice v. Stewart et al, 184 Miss. 202,
184 So. 44, 185 So. 247 (1938); Angelo v. R. Comm., 194 Wisc. 543, 217 N. W.
570 (1928).
21 Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18; Angelo v. R. Comm., supra; See Note, 23
A. L. R. 757 (1923).
original states at the time of the Revolution, by virtue of their succession to the
sovereignty.2 2  Under the Commerce Clause23 and the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Clause 24 of the Constitution, however, the states relinquished to the federal
government the power to promote and regulate navigation. 2  This power,
because of its dual derivation, is not restricted to situations affecting interstate
commerce; "in maritime matters, it extends to all matters and places to which
the maritime law extends. '" 2 6  Nor is it, as was at first asserted,2 7 confined to
navigation in tidal waters. It empowers the federal government to do whatever
is necessary and proper for the promotion and control of navigation in the
Great Lakes 23 or any other water which is, in fact, navigable; 29 and even to
cut off navigation completely in one body of water for the benefit of navigation
in another.3 0 As new states were admitted to the Union, each was permitted to
retain sovereignty over its navigable riverbeds (subject to the above-mentioned
federal power), in order that they might enter "on an equal footing" with the
original states.2 '
In no state is property in the beds of navigable tidal waters vested in the
riparian proprietors. It is generally held that the beds of these rivers are held
"in trust" by the states for the benefit of the public. 2  In interpreting this
"trust theory", there is little uniformity. Some courts assert that the States are
without power to grant away the riverbeds;38 others, that the proceeds of any
grant must be used for a public purpose; 4 while some merely assert that such
grants must be strictly construed.33 In some states, the scope of riverbed and
lakebed leases is limited by statute.86
Although the soil beneath the river remains the property of the state, the
riparian proprietors have certain traditional "riparian rights" incident to the
ownership of the shore, which are valuable property and can neither be taken
nor destroyed without compensation. 7 Among those frequently mentioned are
22 Ibid; cf. State v. Loy, 74 N. D. 182, 20 N. W. 2d 668 (1945).
23 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
24 U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
25 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824); The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443 (1851);
Hawkins Point Lighthouse Case, 39 Fed. 77 (D. Md. 1889), rev'd on other grounds,
155 U. S. 102 (1894); U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra note 7; Mason Co. v. Tax
Commission, 302 U. S. 186 (1937); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co., v. U. S., 204 Fed.
489 (E. D. Va. 1913); Bailey v. U. S., 62 Ct. Cl. 77 (1926).2 6 1n Re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 12 (1891).
27 The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428 (1825).
28 The Genesee Chief, supra note 25.
2
9The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871).
30 U. S. v. Commodore Park, 324 U. S. 386 (1945).
81 U. S. v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1 (1935); U. S. v. Ashton, 170 Fed. 509 (W. D. Wash.
1909); Statev. Loy, 74 N. D. 182, 20 N. W. 2d 668 (1945).
82 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845).
23 Home v. Richards, 4 Call (8 Va.) 441 (1798).
84City of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal. 2d 254, 188 P. 2d 17 (1948); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S. E. 875 (1904).
" Darling v. City of Newport News, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315 (1918).
36E. g.. 62 Va. Code 1.
8 Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. U. S., supra note 24; Hilt v. Weber, supra note
(1) the right to be and remain a riparian proprietor and to enjoy the natural
advantages thereby conferred, (2) the right of access, (3) the right to build
a pier or wharf out to the channel, (4) the right to accretions or alluvium, (5)
the right to make reasonable use of the water or, in certain jurisdictions, to
appropriate it (see Page 38 infra), and (6) the right to occupy, improve, and
reclaim the surface of the submerged land for any private purposes, subject to the
public interest. 8
These riparian rights are, however, servient both to the federal navigation
power"3 and to the public right of navigation;40 and where the deprivation
results from the exercise of these dominant interests, no compensation is allowable.
Thus, when a breakwater, erected by the City of Santa Barbara, for the purpose
of aiding navigation, caused the water to flow in such a way as to erode the
beach of a littoral proprietor, this was not deemed a "taking," and he was
denied compensation.41  "Acts done, as here, in the proper exercise of govern-
mental powers and not directly encroaching upon private property, though
their consequences may impair its use, are not a taking within the meaning of the
constitutional provision," said the Court.
Again, where a federal dam raised the water level seven feet, endangering a
railroad embankment built in the bed of a navigable stream, the proprietor was
denied recovery, on the grounds that
One who builds in the bed of a navigable stream, builds subject to the
power of the United States, without compensation to erect structures in the
interest of improving navigability which may endanger the privately con-
structed structure.
42
It has been said that the state cannot defeat riparian rights by a grant of
land under water, nor cut off the owner's access to the water by construction
of a highway, nor grant to strangers the right to erect wharves in front of the
property.4 On the other hand, where the federal government builds a light-
house obstructing the access of a littoral proprietor, he is not entitled to
compensation, because of the federal navigation power.
4 4
Regarding the right to the use of the water, the Restatement of Torts cites
three theories: the "natural flow" theory (in effect in England) that the owner
11; State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, 1095 (1914); Petraborg v. Zontelli,
supra note 11; Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra note 29.
""Hilt v. Weber, supra note 11; Nelson v. DeLong, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N. W. 2d 342
(1942); State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N. W. 2d 657 (1947);
Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra note 29.
39 See note 24 supra.
40 Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18; People v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 166 Cal. 627,
138 Pac. 103 (1913); Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 143 P. 2d 1
(1943); Oliver v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 538, 178 S. E. 48, opinion adhered to 165
Va. 538, 183 S. E. 513 (1936).
41 Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, supra.
4
2U. S. v. Chicago . .R. Co., 312 U. S. 592 (1941).
48 Hilt v. Weber, supra note 11.
44 Hawkins Point Lighthouse Case, supra note 24.
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has a right to an undiminished supply of water, which may be used only on or
in connection with the riparian land; the "reasonable use" theory, that any
riparian owner may have full beneficial use of the water so long as he does not
unreasonably interfere with the use by others; and the "appropriation" theory
(in force in several arid states) that the right of each claimant shall be
determined by his priority of appropriation."
The sole compensable interest of the riparian proprietor in waters adjacent
to his land on a navigable tidal river or harbor, is, therefore, in the preservation
of his "riparian rights."
Non-Navigable Rivers and Streams
Since pre-Revolutionary times, it has been well settled that he who owns the
bank of a non-navigable stream owns the bed to the thread of the stream. 6
Where an American river is, in fact, incapable of navigation, it belongs to the
riparian proprietors as fully as the upland.47  This is true, even though under the
original patent from the federal government, the first grantee paid only for the
land contained within the surveyor's meander line.4" The possibilities of this
rule were illustrated in Oklahoma v. Texas,4" when the Supreme Court was
called on to decide the conflicting claims of the United States, the States of
Texas and Oklahoma, sundry riparian proprietors, and placer miners, to the
bed of the Red River, where oil had just been discovered. Finding the river
non-navigable, the court rendered a decision favorable to the riparian owners.
Navigable Non-Tidal Rivers
There is a division among the states as to whether non-tidal rivers which
are, in fact, navigable should be deemed navigable in law for purposes of de-
termining ownership of the riverbed. In Mississippi, Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky,
Wisconsin, and West Virginia, the English rule that only tidal waters are
navigable is followed.50 As in England, these states consider their great fresh
water rivers highways, subject to public easement for purposes of travel."1
Ownership of these riverbeds is also servient to the federal power to control
and promote navigation which governs any waterway navigable in fact." But
the riparian owners have sufficient title to maintain trespass against intruders
who attempt to remove sand and gravel,"3 even though, by federal statute, no
45 4 Restatements, Torts § 342.
460klahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574 (1922); Hood v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 408, 165
So. 219 (1936).
47 I Thompson, Real Property § 96.
"s Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18.
49258 U. S. 574 (1922).
60 Archer v. Gravel Co., 233 U. S. 60 (1914); U. S. v. Willow Run Power Co.,
324 U. S. 499 (1945); Kessinger v. St. Oil Co. of Ind., 245 Ill. App. 376 (1925);
McMorran Co. v. Little Co., 201 Mich. 301 167 N. W. 990 (1918).
81 Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18; State v. Korrer, supra note 32.
52 McMorran Co. v. Little Co., supra note 45.
53 Archer v. Gravel Co., supra note 45; Union Sand & Gravel Co. v. Northcott, supra
note 45.
one, not even the riparian owner, may dredge the riverbed without an Army
permit.54  It is competent for riparian owners in the states following the
English rule to grant to others their interest in the riverbed.
In the majority of the states, the courts have found it illogical to continue
to use the English definition. On this point, state law is controlling.55  It is
the general rule that any river which is navigable in fact is deemed navigable
at law. Where this rule is adopted, the alignment of interests becomes the
same as in the case of navigable tidal rivers, with the riparian landowner holding
only his basic "riparian rights."
It is said that title to the Potomac River and its tributaries, within the
District of Columbia, is vested in the United States, by reason of cession from
Maryland and Virginia.
56
A public right to take sand and gravel from the beds of navigable rivers
for domestic purposes has been asserted. 7 However, statutes requiring those
who take these materials to pay a fixed amount to the State have been upheld.58
Some statutes forbid any but the adjacent proprietor to remove sand and gravel
from the riverbed." This privilege of the riparian owner is referred to as a
profit a prendre.60 No title passes until the materials have been reduced to
possession. It is a permissive, rather than a property right, revocable at will,
and co-extensive with the title to the land. 1 Such a right, although it might
enhance the value of the upland in the eyes of a prospective purchaser, must be
considered a contingent or speculative matter, not admissible as evidence of fair
market value." Another right ordinarily non-compensable is the statutory
preference to riparian proprietors in the granting of oyster leases. Such a
preference, even when exercised, has been held to give the lessee no property
right as against the state or federal government in the exercise of its lawful
functions. The state may, without liability, erect a sewage vent just above his
oysterbeds. 63 Formerly, oyster planters must also assume the risk of destruction
through federal dredging activities.64  This injustice has been corrected by
statute.
65
5433 U. S. C. § 403 (1899).
5-Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661 (1891).
56 U. S. v. Groen, 72 F. Supp. 713 (1947).
57Bohn v. Gerdes, 309 Ill. App. 206, 32 N. E. 2d 1000 (1941).
5 State v. Southern Sand & Mat. Co., 113 Ark. 149, 167 S. W. 854 (1914); State
v. Kivett, 228 Ind. 623, 95 N. E. 2d 145 (1950); State v. Akers, 92 Kan. 169, 140 Pac.
637 (1914), aIJ'd 245 U. S. 154 (1917); Petraborg v. Zontelli, supra note 11.
59 Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Columbia Granite & Dredging Corp., 146 Md. 384,
126 At. 91 (1924); 62 VA. CODE §§ 178, 181.
60 Consumers' Sand Co. v. Exec. Council, 126 Kan. 233, 268 Pac. 123 (1928).
61 Smoot Corp. v. Columbia Granite & Dredging Corp., supra note 54.
62 Cf. note 7 supra.
65 Darling v. Newport News, supra note 30.
6 4 Lewis Blue Pt. Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82 (1913).
6 5 28 U. S. C. § 1497 (1948).
Lakes
In England, and in states accepting the English definition of navigability, one
would presume that all lakes should be classed non-navigable, and their beds
portioned out as private property. However, Halsbury states that it is "doubt-
ful" whether this presumption is justified." Examination of recent American
decisions reveals an equally unsettled condition in this country. There seems
to be no English authority on the question; but the House of Lords has held that
title to a lakebed in Ireland could not be presumed to be in the Crown;6 7
while it has held that, in Scotland, riparian owners have common rights of
hunting and fishing but several rights in the lakebed for purposes of removing
coal and marl. 8
The Massachusetts Bay Colony early adopted an ordinance, which was
preserved after statehood, that all ponds over ten acres in area must remain
common property.69 This was carried over into the laws of New Hampshire and
Maine.7° The beds of the Great Lakes are the property of the surrounding
states. They were, at one time, compared to the sea, under the belief that the
soil beneath the marginal sea belonged to the adjacent States. 1 These dicta were
"1clarified" (i.e., rejected) in U.S. v. California7 2 the first of the "Tidelands Oil"
cases; but the result remains unchanged as to the Great Lakes.
Constitutional and statutory provisions in Washington, California, Louisiana,
Indiana, and North Dakota7 1 preserve the beds of navigable lakes as property
of the state. Other states, by analogy to streams, hold navigable lakebeds to be
state property.7 4  In this connection, the test of navigability is, not present
navigability, but the condition of the lake at the time when the state was
admitted to the union. 75  A Louisiana statute authorizes the sale of lakebeds
by the state whenever the lake has become non-navigable since statehood. 6
The reason generally advanced for holding the beds of navigable lakes to
be vested in the states is that it would be unreasonable for the owner of a few
acres of shore to control hundreds of acres of lakebed.7 7  But, as in the case of
66 3 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 120.
67 Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641, 666 (1878).
68 Mackenzie v. Bankes, 3 App. Cas. 1324, 1340 (1878).
69 Hardin v. Jordan, suPra note 18.
70 Ibid; See also, Note, 23 A. L. R. 757 (1923).
71 Ibid; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Ill., supra note 18.
72332 U. S. 19, 804 (1947).
71 Wash. Const., Art. 17, § 1; N. Dak. Const., § 210; Note, 23 A. L. R. 757, 773.
74Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18, at 389; U. S. v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1 (1935);
State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So. 2d 136 (1944); State v. Korrer, supra note 32;
Anderson v. Ray, 37 S. Dak. 17, 156 N. W. 591 (1916); Angelo v. R. Comm. supra
note 20.75 State v. Jefferson I. Salt Mining Co., Inc., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935); State
v. Longyear Holding Co., supra note 33; Monroe v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P. 2d 759
(1946).
76 Hall v. Bossier Levee Dist. Com'rs, 111 La. 913, 35 So. 976 (1904).
77 Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18; Angelo v. R. Comm., supra note 20.
navigable rivers, state law governs the disposition of the beds of navigable
lakes."8 If a state chooses to resign to the riparian proprietors rights which
properly belong to the state, in its sovereign capacity, it is not for others to
raise objections. The effect of federal grants will therefore be interpreted in the
light of state law.79
In Michigan and Indiana, it has been held that "section lines" of govern-
ment surveys form underwater boundaries of the riparian lands. This may result
in giving the entire lakebed to one riparian owner, to the exclusion of others.
80
Generally, Michigan, Illinois, and Mississippi are committed to the doctrine
that there are the same'riparian rights to the center in the lakes (except the
Great Lakes) as there are to the thread of fresh water rivers.81
Where the state holds title to the lakebed, whether it may dispose of
substances deposited therein, depends on its interpretation of the "trust theory."
In Washington, ownership of the lakebeds by the State is absolute, and they
may be granted away in fee. 2  In other states where the question has arisen,
mineral rights in the lakebeds may be sold to private persons for limited periods,
so long as the proceeds are to be used for public benefit.
Where a lake is, in fact, non-navigable, it is generally held that title is in
the riparian proprietors to the center of the water. 83 The courts presume that
the federal government, in disposing of ungranted land lying on the shores of a
lake, intended that the adjoining bed pass with the upland, unless evidence to the
contrary appears.8 4 This land, once vested, cannot be divested without compensa-
tion. Therefore, a statute attempting to appropriate certain non-navigable lakes
to the state, by a fictitious definition of "navigable" has been held invalid."8
As between the United States and a State, the title to ungranted non-navigable
lakebeds remains in the federal government. The United States was thus within
its rights, in declaring such a lake in the State of Oregon a national game
preserve.88
Conclusion
In this paper, there has been no attempt to survey comprehensively the law
of waters of the United States. But it is hoped that the foregoing will prove
78 Ozark Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N. D. 464, 37 N. W. 2d 488 (1949).
79 Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18, at 382.
8o Id. at 398.
81Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18; Hilt v. Weber, supra note 11; Richardson v.
Sims, 118 Miss. 728, 80 So. 4 (1918).
82 Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, supra note 24.
83Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951); Richardson v. Sims,
supra note 76; Ozark Mahoning Co. v. State, supra note 73; Anderson v. Ray, supra note
69; Monroe v. State, supra note 70.
84 Ozark Mahoning Co. v. State, supra note 73.
85 Ibid at 492; Angelo v. R. Comm., supra note 20.
88 U. S. v. Oregon, supra note 26.
useful in underscoring some of the problems to be investigated in the assessment
of riparian property in eminent domain proceedings. Without a thorough
investigation of the interests of the riparian or littoral proprietor, as expressed
in the case and statute law of the situs, it would not be possible to arrive at that
fair market value which constitutes his "just compensation" for the deprivation of
those interests.
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